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Abstract. Towards the very end of his wide-ranging lectures on the phi-
losophy of art, Hegel unexpectedly expresses a preference for comedy over trag-
edy. More surprisingly, given his systematic claims for his aesthetic theory, he 
suggests that this preference is arbitrary. I suggest, however, that this arbitrar-
iness is itself systematic, given Hegel’s claims about unity and necessity in art 
generally and his analysis of ancient as opposed to modern drama in particular. 
With the emergence of modern subjectivity, tragic plots lose their necessity and so 
their redemptive conclusions; comic plots disintegrate into mockery and entertain-
ment. In many cases, the dramas in question consequently fail to be art. This does 
not, however, mean that art ends: insofar as it inspires humans to a better under-
standing of their unity with the divine, it will continue to meet its mandate. But the 
lack of necessity in modern drama means we are free to prefer happy endings. He-
gel’s seemingly arbitrary preference is, in the end, systematically justified.  
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Hegel is not a philosopher known for his levity. The system-
atic rigor with which he approaches any topic is daunting; the den-
sity of his language and conceptual structure would seem to pre-
clude even the possibility of lightheartedness. It is then surprising 
to read Hegel expressing, in the last pages of his lectures on the 
philosophy of art, an apparently personal preference for comedy. 
«A happy denouement has at least as much justification as an un-
happy one», he suggests; «and when it is a matter of considering 
this difference alone, I must admit that for my part a happy de-
 
1 My thanks to members of Professor Georg Bertam’s colloquium at Freie Uni-
versität Berlin, to members of Professor Klaus Vieweg’s Forschungskolloquium 
Deutscher Idealismus at the Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, and to Bernard 
Prusak for very helpful discussion of this text. 
2 Colby College. 
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nouement is to be preferred». To this already unexpected prefer-
ence, Hegel adds a seemingly innocent question: «And», he asks, 
«why not?»3.  
Coming at the end of an explicitly systematic treatment of art 
and art history ranging from Indian pantheistic poetry to the ironic 
smugness of his own contemporaries, this «And why not?» is almost 
as surprising as Hegel’s professed preference for a cheerful end to 
a dramatic performance. Is Hegel in the last moments of his lectures 
abandoning his pledge to give a scientific account of art, derived 
 
3 G.W.F. HEGEL, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, in ID., Werke in 20 Bänden, ed. by 
E. Moldenhauer and K.M. Michel, 20 vols., vols. 13-15 (I-III), Suhrkamp, Frank-
furt am Main 1970, III, p. 567; English trans. by T.M. Knox, Hegel’s Aesthetics: 
Lectures on Fine Art, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1975, p. 1232. Abbreviated 
Ä followed by the volume of the German edition, the German page number 
and finally the English page number. The basis of these sources is a compilation 
of Hegel’s lectures published by his student Heinrich Gustav Hotho in 1835. 
Philological issues undermining the authority of Hotho’s edition have been well 
known for several decades, prompting some scholars to defer instead to more 
recently published student notes from individual lecture cycles (see A. 
GETHMANN-SIEFERT, Einführung in Hegels Ästhetik, Fink, Munich 2005, pp. 17-
18 and Gethmann-Siefert’s introduction to G.W.F. HEGEL, Vorlesungen über die 
Philosophie der Kunst (Mitschrift Hotho 1823), ed. by A. Gethmann-Siefert, Meiner, 
Hamburg 2003, pp. XV-XLVI, p. XXII). For specific discussion of Hotho’s 
tendentious editing in the sections on comedy, see H. SCHNEIDER, Hegels Theorie 
der Komik und die Auflösung der schönen Kunst, «Jahrbuch für Hegelforschung», I, 
1995, pp. 81-110, pp. 82-83. Given the richness of Hotho’s text, its long influence 
in Hegel scholarship, and the fact that Hotho had access to additional sources now 
lost to us, I have chosen to use his 1835 compilation with reference to student 
notes when appropriate. The quotation in my title provides a case in point: the 
exact phrase («Und warum auch nicht?») does not appear in any of the individual 
lecture cycles published to date. But its suggestion – that with the advance of sub-
jectivity, art’s necessity is weakened and arbitrary preference is the only systematic 
response – is, as I hope to make clear, supported by Hegel’s philosophy generally 
as well as suggestions within the student lecture notes. The four available editions 
of student lecture notes are G.W.F. HEGEL, Vorlesungen über Ästhetik: Berlin 
1820/21, ed. by H. Schneider, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 1995; ID., Vorle-
sungen über die Philosophie der Kunst (Mitschrift Hotho 1823), cit.; ID., Philosophie der 
Kunst (Mitschrift von der Pfordten 1826), ed. by A. Gethmann-Siefert, Jeong-Im 
Kwon, and Karsten Berr, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 2004; ID., Philosophie 
der Kunst oder Ästhetik (Mitschrift von Kehler 1826), ed. by A. Gethmann-Siefert and 
B. Collenberg-Plotnikov, Fink, Munich 2004. 
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dialectically from its own concept?4 Do claims to art’s systematic 
wholeness dissolve, as it were, in laughter? 
In fact, Hegel’s apparently offhanded preference for happy 
endings, far from being arbitrary, clarifies several vexing systematic 
issues regarding comedy’s position at the conclusion of his lectures 
on aesthetics. It also, I will argue, sheds light on Hegel’s notorious 
claim about the end of art. Comedy in one sense quite clearly con-
stitutes the end of art in Hegel’s system: it is the last form of drama; 
drama is the final development of poetry; poetry is the last «indi-
vidual art» Hegel discusses in Part III, the concluding section of 
these lectures. But it has remained unclear in the generations since 
Hegel’s death whether comedy’s position at the end of this dialectic 
establishes it as the high point of the highest stage of art, or 
whether instead it signals an undignified end to art’s otherwise so-
phisticated trajectory. The scholarship has remained divided: Jack 
Kaminsky on the one hand disparages comedy as a distracting es-
cape for the lower classes; Gary Shapiro on the other claims that 
its «culminating» status in the progression of the Aesthetics makes it 
«supreme»5.  
 
4 Ä, I, p. 40; p. 22. 
5 See J. KAMINSKY, Hegel on Art, SUNY Press, Albany 1962, p. 166; G. SHAPIRO, 
Hegel’s Dialectic of Artistic Meaning, «Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism», 
XXXV (1), 1976, pp. 23-35, p. 32. Other arguments for comedy’s preeminence 
include Anne Paolucci, who describes Hegel as claiming that comedy provides 
the «ultimate aesthetic catharsis, beyond which art is powerless to move us» (A. 
PAOLUCCI, Hegel’s Theory of Comedy, in Comedy: New Perspectives, ed. by M. Charney, 
New Literary Forum, New York 1978, pp. 89-108, p. 104). Gasché claims that 
the «structural aspect of comedy (as understood by Hegel) […] would suggest a 
principal priority of the comic over the tragic for the understanding of both 
tragedy and dialectics» (R. GASCHÉ, Self-dissolving Seriousness: On the Comic in the 
Hegelian Concept of Tragedy, in Philosophy and Tragedy, ed. by S. Sparks and M. de 
Beistegui, Routledge, London 2000, pp. 38-56, p. 41). Benjamin Rutter argues 
that «comedy concludes or completes art, whose project is the embodiment of 
reconciliation, by completing that reconciliation itself» (B. RUTTER, Hegel on the 
Modern Arts, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010, p. 226). Desmond 
describes comedy as «a certain acme of the aesthetic» (W. DESMOND, Can Phi-
losophy Laugh at Itself? On Hegel and Aristophanes, «The Owl of Minerva», XX (2), 
1989, pp. 131-149, p. 139). Roche by contrast argues that Hegel’s placing comedy 
at the end of art’s development is a «mistake that derives from his absolutization 
of subjectivity and subsequent neglect of intersubjectivity» (M.W. ROCHE, Tragedy 
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My argument will be that both Kaminsky’s dismissal and 
Shapiro’s praise are too extreme, in part because of the way Hegel’s 
assessment of ancient comedy – in particular the so-called Old 
Comedy of Aristophanes – differs from his assessment of modern 
comedy. Old Comedy, I will suggest, by one measure achieves an 
unparalleled synthesis in art’s development, but already in its tri-
umph we see the beginning of art’s end. The reason for both com-
edy’s triumph and its dissolution lies in the development of sub-
jectivity and its subsequent depiction in the action that characterizes 
drama as a new art form. Ultimately, subjectivity will positively af-
fect the development of freedom that is Hegel’s overarching goal. 
But its appearance in art undermines both the unity and the neces-
sity that characterize art. In doing so, subjectivity shifts art’s focus 
from the divine to the mundane, driving drama into the prosaic 
and precipitating art’s transition into religion and philosophy. Sub-
jectivity is, then, a major catalyst behind the end of art in Hegel’s 
sense, and nowhere is subjectivity’s power – for better and for 
worse – more evident than in comedy. 
 
 
1. The True, The Whole, and The Essence of Art  
 
First, some background. The true, Hegel famously claims, is 
the whole. Reality is not a set of atomized objects but an interre-
lated unified totality. But this whole is neither static nor undiffer-
entiated: in order to be a true whole, it must include division and 
then reunification. The whole must, as Hegel sometimes puts it, go 
out of itself into division, then return to itself through acknowl-
edgment that the resulting parts are part of itself and so constitute 
a unity. This development from unity to division to recognized re-
unification is, in Hegel’s system, also necessary. It begins, as Hegel 
explains in the Logic, with being, which is necessarily limited by 
non-being; the two dialectically produce becoming, and Hegel’s en-
 
and Comedy: A Systematic Study and a Critique of Hegel, State University of New York 
Press, Albany 1998, p. 40).  
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tire system – everything from astronomy to the diagnosis of insan-
ity to the need for a monarch – unfolds in dialectical progression6. 
In this vast conceptual scheme, humans are the part of the whole 
that provides the conscious recognition of its dialectical essence by 
conceptualizing and articulating that essence. Hegel calls this dy-
namic interplay of unity, necessity, and recognition the Idea7. 
Hegel uses several apparent binaries to articulate this true 
that is the whole: binaries that, upon philosophical analysis, turn 
out instead to be evidence of mutually determining unity. One of 
these binaries is the distinction between divine and human. Ulti-
mately, Hegel argues, the divine is the human and only humans’ 
recognition of this truth can complete the ultimate reunification 
that in turn confirms the truth as the whole8. Two consequences 
of this claim are relevant for our purposes. The first is Hegel’s 
conviction that humans do not merely encounter a world filled 
with objects that they passively apprehend. Hegel’s idealism in-
stead suggests that we, together with each other and our sur-
roundings, create the reality in which we live. The second is that 
this creative responsibility extends to the normative sphere: hu-
mans are also collectively responsible for the norms governing, 
for example, family and political life. But humans have not always 
recognized this, instead attributing creation of both the physical 
world and the normative sphere to distant gods. As long as they 
do this, Hegel thinks, humans will be unable to understand the 
true that is the whole. More concretely expressed: only when hu-
mans stop looking to an externally posited god and acknowledge 
themselves as co-constitutors of their own world and norms will 
 
6 G.W.F. HEGEL, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse: Die 
Wissenschaft der Logik, in ID., Werke in 20 Bänden, ed. by E. Moldenhauer and K.M. 
Michel, 20 vols., vol. 8, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1970, § 86-88; English 
trans. by T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, and H.S. Harris, The Encyclopedia Logic: 
Part I of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze, Hackett, 
Indianapolis 1991. This is not to say that historical events themselves are inevi-
table, a point I argue for in L. MOLAND, Hegel’s Philosophy of History, in Hegel: Key 
Concepts, ed. by M. Baur, Routledge, New York 2014, pp. 128-139. 
7 Hegel discusses these concepts throughout his lectures; one central section 
begins at Ä, I, p. 145; p. 106.  
8 See for instance ivi, p. 113; p. 80. 
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they recognize the real unity at the heart of existence. Only this 
recognition will allow them to realize that they in fact give them-
selves the law and are thus self-determining and free.  
Absolute Spirit is Hegel’s overarching term for art, religion, 
and philosophy: three ways in which humans attempt to articulate 
the true that is the whole. Among these three, art is unique in that 
it attempts to convey the Idea sensuously, giving it «determinate 
form». The «Idea in a determinate form» Hegel then calls the Ideal9. 
Art in other words sensuously expresses our unity with the world 
by highlighting our creative powers: by showing how we transform 
marble into sculpture, pigment into paintings, sounds into music, 
words into poetry. In this process, we convert found objects into 
artworks that express our thoughts and emotions. The object is no 
longer the same, and neither are we, meaning that artworks model 
the mutual formation that Hegel thinks characterizes reality. Every 
artistic endeavor allows humans to engage in mutual formation 
with the world explicitly in a way they otherwise do only implicitly. 
Hegel sometimes phrases this claim in terms of humans transform-
ing the prosaic – the everyday, the quotidian – into the poetic. «Po-
etic» here is not limited to poetry proper but – true to its etymo-
logical roots in «to make» – describes a general characteristic of art. 
Humans’ poetic endeavors transform the given into the made, 
unite subject and object in mutual determination, and so express 
the unity underlying reality. «[T]he truly poetical element in art», 
Hegel says, «is just what we have called the Ideal»10. 
In order to express truth sensuously, art imposes both unity 
and necessity on its matter. A painting should include only forms 
and colors that support its overarching composition; all sounds 
united into a song should contribute to its tonal and rhythmic 
structure; a drama should contain only those actions that support 
the plotline’s coherence11. Art, in other words, should unify, purify, 
 
9 Ivi, p. 145; p. 106. 
10 Ivi, p. 213; pp. 161-162. 
11 Ivi, p. 206; p. 155. See Hegel’s description of harmony at ivi, p. 187; p. 140. 
See also his analysis of how a poet decides what constitutes the beginning of a 
drama’s action at ivi, p. 233; p. 217. 
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and enhance the familiar world around us, giving it both an artifi-
cial simplicity and a heightened sense of necessity. As long as art 
does this, it conveys an image of the unity at the heart of reality 
and allows humans to sense their status as mutual creators of the 
world.  
So understood, the determinate expression of the Idea consti-
tutes Hegel’s basic definition of art. But Hegel reserves the term 
‘beauty’ for art that expresses humans’ unity with the divine most 
completely. Beauty «cancels the one-sidedness […] of the subject 
and its object alike»12 and so presents this unity in most sensible 
form. This correspondence was possible only in a circumscribed 
period in ancient Greece in which, as we will see, the interpenetra-
tion of human and divine was most perfectly achieved for reasons 
as much philosophical and political as aesthetic. But even when it 
does not achieve this fullest level of beauty, art should strive to 
convey the unity of human and divine by showcasing humans’ cre-
ative, normative capabilities. Its sensuous nature means that art can 
never fully articulate our mutually formative capacities: that full ar-
ticulation is left to philosophy. But being the sensuous attempt at 
this articulation assures art’s value in Hegel’s philosophical scheme. 
Art is nothing less than «one way of bringing to our minds and 
expressing the Divine, the deepest interests of mankind, and the 
most comprehensive truths of the spirit»13: three ways of formulat-
ing what is ultimately the same content. 
 
 
2. Subjectivity and the Emergence of Drama 
 
Hegel divides the development of art into three major phases. 
In art’s first, symbolic phase, humans conceive of themselves as 
distinct from the divine and search for meaning in unrelated ob-
jects: in natural events, in stone, in animals. But especially in Greek 
sculpture of the mid-fifth century BC, humans began to imagine 
 
12 Ivi, p. 154; p. 113. 
13 Ivi, p. 21; p. 7. 
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the divine in their own form14. In these human-shaped gods, «the 
spiritual was completely drawn through its external appearance; in 
this beautiful unification it idealized the natural and made it into an 
adequate embodiment of spirit’s own substantial individuality»15. 
Human and divine found perfect interpenetration, in other words, 
in the idealized human forms given to Athena or Zeus. This inter-
penetration accounts for the «serene peace and bliss» characteristic 
of art of this period16. Even when they are depicted as engaging in 
struggles with each other or with other humans, the gods are 
«brought back out of every collision and complication […] into 
pure absorption in themselves. This most austere repose, not rigid, 
cold, and dead, but sensitive and immutable, is the highest and 
most adequate form of portrayal for the classical gods»17. Because 
of its deep unity and peacefulness, «classical art became a concep-
tually adequate representation of the Ideal, the consummation of 
the realm of beauty»18. If the Idea is the unity of the divine and the 
human, classical Greek art achieves this unity in sensuous form most 
completely.  
The serenity of this period of Greek sculpture also reflected a 
deep harmony in Greek civilization itself: in this world «there was 
no question of an independence of the political sphere contrasted 
with a subjective morality distinct from it»19. Individuals in ancient 
Greece, in other words, lived in deep, uncritical unity with the eth-
ical life surrounding them. But as Hegel suggests in his lectures on 
 
14 Stephen Houlgate gives a convincing description of which period of sculpture 
Hegel had in mind in this analysis: see S. HOULGATE, Hegel on the Beauty of Sculp-
ture, in Hegel and the Arts, ed. by S. Houlgate, Northwestern University Press, 
Chicago 2007, pp. 56-89. 
15 Ä, II, p. 127; p. 517. 
16 Interpenetration, or Durchdringung, is one of the characteristics of art Hegel 
emphasizes in his brief comments on art in the Encyclopedia: see § 559 (English 
trans. by A.V. Miller and William Wallace, Philosophy of Mind, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1971). See also the discussion of Durchdringung as key to Hegel’s philos-
ophy of art in A. SPEIGHT, Philosophy of Art, in G.W.F. Hegel: Key Concepts, cit., pp. 
103-115, p. 104.  
17 Ä, II, p. 87; p. 486. 
18 Ivi, pp. 127-128; p. 517. 
19 Ivi, p. 26; p. 437. 
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the history of philosophy, developments both historical and phil-
osophical began to splinter this unity, resulting in the emergence 
of subjectivity: a sense of self independent from community that 
does not accept tradition as authoritative but requires justification 
in thought20. To repeat: in the long term, this subjective satisfaction 
is essential for the self-determination that Hegel thinks character-
izes full freedom. Ultimately, the institutions of ethical life should 
incorporate subjectivity, integrating individual humans’ critical ca-
pacities into the family, civil society, and the state.  
But Greek political institutions, built as they were on ac-
ceptance of divine law, had no way to integrate such a perspective. 
The demand for rational justification was perceived as a threat. 
Thus excluded from ethical life, the subjective impulse became the 
antagonistic practice of sophistry21. In its most destructive form, 
sophistry was unfettered subjectivity employed in undermining tra-
dition through specious arguments in pursuit of selfish ends22. Yet 
Hegel refuses to vilify the sophists23. They were in a sense ahead of 
their time, articulating a perspective that was justified but required 
a place in the community that the community could not provide. 
Indeed, sophistry found its logical extension in the Socratic 
method: Socrates demanded «to be free not only in the state, as the 
substantial whole, not only in the accepted ethical and legal code, 
but in his own heart»24. Hegel admits that unlike the explicitly de-
structive uses of sophistry, Socrates’ goal was not to attain subjec-
tive ends but rather to achieve the «beautiful, good, true, and 
right»25. Nevertheless, Athenian society remained unequipped to 
 
20 Among the influences Hegel cites in this development are Solon, Anaxagoras, 
and Pericles: G.W.F. HEGEL, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie I, in ID., 
Werke in 20 Bänden, ed. by E. Moldenhauer and K.M. Michel, 20 vols., vol. 18, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1970, pp. 373 ff; English trans. by E.S. Haldane 
and F.H. Simpson, Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Greek Philosophy to Plato, 
University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln 1995, pp. 324 ff. Abbreviated VGP fol-
lowed by German then English page numbers. 
21 Ä, II, p. 118; p. 510. 
22 VGP, I, p. 427; pp. 370-371. 
23 Ivi, pp. 408-409; p. 354. 
24 Ä, II, p. 118; p. 510. 
25 VGP, I, p. 422; p. 366. 
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absorb this critical point of view. According to Hegel, then, Socra-
tes posed a legitimate threat to the Athenian state. As we will see, 
Aristophanes agreed.  
As one of the ways in which humans reflect on their norma-
tive experience, art too began to embody the development of sub-
jectivity26. The result was drama, an art form whose defining char-
acteristic is action. According to Hegel’s technical definition, an 
action is more than a deed or a happening: it requires agents’ in-
trospection, their reflection on their intentions and achievements. 
Characters in drama express this interiority through soliloquy or 
dialogue. In doing so, they reveal two features that «in their har-
mony constitute the essence of every true action». The first is «what 
is in substance good and great, the Divine actualized in the world, as the 
foundation of everything genuine and absolutely eternal». Hegel 
names the family, religion, and the state as such substantial concerns. 
The second is «the subject, the individual himself and his unfettered 
self-determination and freedom»27. Dramatic action, in other words, 
requires the protagonist to interpret a substantial theme through her 
sense of herself as self-determining.  
Ultimately, substance and subject will prove to be one of the 
merely provisional binaries overcome by an understanding of 
unity. But initially, their opposition generates conflict. When the 
individual’s freedom collides with ethical life around her, the result 
is a dramatic plot. Depending on how it combines subject and sub-
stance as the two components of action, drama takes different 
forms. If the drama revolves around substantial issues, tragedy re-
sults. If instead the protagonists’ «subjective caprice, folly, and per-
versity» prevail, the drama will be a comedy28.  
 
A. Ancient Tragedy 
 
Tragedy, then, foregrounds the substantial: the «true content 
of the tragic action» will involve eternal concerns such as the fam-
ily, religion, or the state. Just as important for tragedy is that the 
 
26 Ä, II, p. 120; p. 511. 
27 Ä, III, p. 520; p. 1194. 
28 Ivi, p. 521; p. 1194. 
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characters identify with these concerns completely and are «pre-
pared to answer for that identification»29. So complete is their iden-
tification that «the mere accidents of the individual’s purely per-
sonal life disappear, [and] the tragic heroes of dramatic art have 
risen to become, as it were, works of sculpture»30. Actors in early 
tragedies – for example in the dramas of Aeschylus – in other 
words barely acted. They were effectively moving statues embod-
ying conflicting divine laws, with particular expressions hidden by 
masks and constricting costume limiting gesture31. Sophocles’ 
slightly later tragedies already include more subjectivity: Antigone 
embodies the law of the family, but in her struggle with Creon as 
representing the law of the polis, she articulates her own under-
standing of justice. Antigone and Creon nevertheless illustrate a 
second major characteristic of tragedy that according to Hegel fol-
lows from the deep identification of characters with their roles: 
namely, the one-sidedness of their claims. The completeness with 
which each character identifies with one law over the other dis-
rupts the substantial order. The characters are, at least initially, un-
able to see themselves as part of the same ethical substance. Since 
both sides have divine justification, a clash is inevitable32. 
Essential to a play such as Antigone being art, however, is the 
fact that the drama ends with a reunification that corrects this one-
sidedness. «What is superseded in the tragic denouement», Hegel 
claims,  
 
is only the one-sided particular which had not been able to adapt 
itself to this harmony, and now (and this is the tragic thing in its 
action), unable to renounce itself and its intention, finds itself 
 
29 Ivi, p. 522; p. 1195. 
30 Ibidem. 
31 See H.S. HARRIS, Hegel’s Ladder II: The Odyssey of Spirit, Hackett Publishing, 
Indianapolis 1997, p. 633. 
32 Ä, III, p. 549; p. 1217. Hegel famously also makes Antigone a major focus of his 
analysis of Greek Sittlichkeit in the Phenomenology for instance at § 470 and § 736 
(G.W.F. HEGEL, Phänomenologie des Geistes, in ID., Werke in 20 Bänden, ed. by E. Mold-
enhauer and K.M. Michel, 20 vols., vol. 3, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1970; Eng-
lish trans. by A.V. Miller, Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
1977). 
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condemned to total destruction, or, at the very least, [finds itself] 
forced to abandon, if it can, the accomplishment of its aim33. 
 
Harmony in the form of reunification, in other words, is 
achieved when the individuals are sacrificed or repudiate their orig-
inal aims. Tragic plots thus model a unity going out of itself into 
division and ultimately returning to itself. In depicting conflict that 
is both inevitable and inevitably resolved in the characters’ defeat, 
they also model the necessity at the heart of Hegel’s dialectic. This 
necessary reunification in turn allows tragedy, despite its tension 
between human and divine, to be art: to represent the Idea sensu-
ously by revealing the true that is the whole. In a clear echo of 
Schiller, Hegel suggests that the experience of this reunification 
was what allowed Greek audiences to leave the theater with cheer-
ful hearts despite the death and destruction with which tragedy 
ends34. Such cheering reunification will, according to Hegel, find 
one more explicit expression in the history of art: in the comedies 
of Aristophanes. 
 
B. Ancient Comedy 
 
As opposed to tragedy’s basis in the substantive, comedy em-
phasizes the subjective. In comedy, Hegel writes, «there comes be-
fore our contemplation, in the laughter in which the characters dis-
solve everything, including themselves, the victory of their own 
subjective personality which nevertheless persists self-assured»35. 
This boisterous, self-dissolving subjectivity is best observed in the 
plays of Aristophanes. Most relevant for our purposes is Aristoph-
anes’ Clouds, whose cast includes Socrates himself and whose plot 
directly addresses the sophistical tendencies of subjectivity.  
What, then, characterizes Old Comedy? First: while tragedy 
ends with the subject reuniting with substance either by being de-
stroyed or through renunciation of his original aims, comedy reu-
nites the subject with substance through showing the individual’s 
 
33 Ä, III, p. 524; p. 1197. 
34 Ivi, p. 547; p. 1215. 
35 Ivi, p. 527; p. 1199. 
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aims themselves to be self-negating. The laughable in general is in fact 
a response to a kind of self-negation: Hegel claims that «[e]very 
contrast between something substantive and its appearance, be-
tween an end and the means may be laughable». More specifically, 
we laugh when we see that the «the realization of an end is at the 
same time the end’s own destruction»36. Hegel seems here to build 
on the theory of laughter explicated by Kant in the Critique of Judg-
ment. We laugh, Kant claimed, when «a tense expectation is trans-
formed into nothing». Suppose, he continues, 
 
that the heir of a rich relative wants to arrange for him a very 
solemn funeral service, but complains that things are not quite 
working out: For (he says), the more money I give my mourners 
to look grieved, the more cheerful they look37. 
 
Our (presumed) laughter at this short tale is explained, Kant 
says, by the fact that we worry about the misguided heir’s failed 
arrangements until we see that they are self-defeating, cancelling 
themselves out.  
While Kant employs this insight only to explain brief, joke-
like anecdotes, Hegel uses it to delineate three possible comic plots. 
In the first, «characters and their aims are entirely without sub-
stance and contradictory and therefore they cannot accomplish an-
ything»38. Avarice is Hegel’s initial example since the collection of 
money for its own sake is self-defeating; the point of money is to 
buy the things the miser deprives himself of. The second way a 
plot’s tensions can be resolved into nothing is if the means and the 
ends are contradictory. Here Hegel gives the example of Aristoph-
anes’ Ecclesiazusae in which women’s aspirations to reform the state 
 
36 Ivi, p. 527; p. 1199. Compare G.W.F. HEGEL, Philosophie der Kunst oder Ästhetik 
(Mitschrift von Kehler 1826), cit., p. 234; ID., Philosophie der Kunst (Mitschrift von der 
Pfordten 1826), cit., p. 252; ID., Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst (Mitschrift 
Hotho 1823), cit., pp. 309-310.  
37 I. KANT, Kritik der Urteilskraft, Meiner, Hamburg 1990, pp. 190-191; English 
trans. by Werner S. Pluhar, Critique of Judgment, Hackett Publishing Company, 
Indianapolis 1987, p. 203. 
38 Ä, III, p. 528; p. 1200. Compare G.W.F. HEGEL, Philosophie der Kunst oder Äs-
thetik (Mitschrift von Kehler 1826), cit., p. 234. 
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are inherently contradictory since the means they employ – namely 
their female selves – are so obviously inadequate to the task. A final 
kind of comedy – which as we will see already signals Old Com-
edy’s dissolution – uses «external contingencies» to contrast «inner 
character and external circumstances». Such plots pit characters’ 
aims against the predicaments their intrigues land them in, culmi-
nating in the aims and their accompanying schemes canceling each 
other out39. 
We laugh, then, when aims create tension but are self-negat-
ing: because they are in tension with themselves, because charac-
ters use ridiculous means to pursue them, or because intricate plots 
at least temporarily thwart them. But Hegel specifies that although 
there is no end to what people will laugh at, very little of the laugh-
able is actually comedy. We also laugh at the incongruity in satire, 
senselessness, or silliness; there is also laughter of «derision, scorn, 
[and] despair»40. But Hegel reserves the designation comic for 
works of art that are dramas and as such (in Hegel’s schema) also 
poetic: plot-based, enacted works that use rhyme scheme and meter 
to play with language as well as to communicate characters’ inten-
tions. In addition, Hegel limits the designation comic to dramas 
exhibiting the subjective attitude that defines comedy. Comedy, in 
short, is cheerful:  
  
[comedy] implies an infinite light-heartedness and confidence felt 
by someone raised altogether above his own inner contradiction 
and not bitter or miserable in it at all: this is the bliss and ease of 
 
39 Hegel gives no examples of this kind of comedy, but Roche suggests that the 
plays of Menander or Shakespeare’s Midsummer Night’s Dream might fit the de-
scription. Roche however concludes that Hegel’s derivation of these comic plots 
is not dialectical and suggests a different, much expanded order (M.W. ROCHE, 
Hegel’s Theory of Comedy in the Context of Hegelian and Modern Reflections on Comedy, 
«Revue Internationale de Philosophie», LVI (221), 2002, pp. 411-430, pp. 416 
ff.). For reasons that will become clear below, it seems to me that Hegel in fact 
needs plots foregrounding intrigue to be the culminating form in order to tran-
sition to his analysis of New Comedy and satire. My claim, then, is that Hegel’s 
progression is consistent as it is. 
40 Ä, III, p. 528; p. 1200. 
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a man who, being sure of himself, can bear the frustration of his 
aims and achievements41. 
  
True comedy is in other words possible when the character’s 
aims are self-defeating and he does not identify fully with those 
aims in the way that tragic characters do. Through their antics, their 
lewdness, and their mischief, comic protagonists stay at a distance 
even from their own aims and so remain unmoved when their pro-
jects fail. Such characters can, in short, laugh at themselves, allow-
ing the audience to laugh with them42. If instead «an individual is 
serious in identifying himself with such an inherently false aim» and 
miserably clings to it, «there is none of the real essence of comedy», 
no matter how much the audience laughs43.  
Comic protagonists’ imperturbability makes them powerful 
and free: they «reveal themselves as having something higher in 
them because they are not seriously tied to the finite world with 
which they are engaged but are raised above it»44. In comedy, «man 
as subject or person has made himself completely master of every-
thing»45; comic protagonists are in fact «all the more imperturbable 
the more incapable they obviously are of accomplishing their un-
dertaking»46. Hegel explicitly describes this imperturbability as rem-
iniscent of the Greek statues that perfectly embodied the interpen-
etration of human and divine: comedy’s lighthearted destruction 
briefly restores «the smiling blessedness of the Olympian gods, 
their unimpaired equanimity which comes home in men and can 
put up with everything»47. Like tragedy, then, comedy returns to 
the unity of the gods from which action originated. «It is to this 
 
41 Ibidem. Compare G.W.F. HEGEL, Philosophie der Kunst oder Ästhetik (Mitschrift 
von Kehler 1826), cit., p. 235; ID., Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst (Mitschrift 
Hotho 1823), cit., pp. 309-310. 
42 Ä, III, p. 569; p. 1233. 
43 Ivi, p. 529; p. 1200. Compare G.W.F. HEGEL, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie 
der Kunst (Mitschrift Hotho 1823), cit., p. 310. 
44 Ä, III, p. 553; p. 1221. 
45 Ivi, p. 527; p. 1199. 
46 Ivi, p. 554; p. 1222. 
47 Ibidem. Compare ivi, pp. 310-311 and G.W.F. HEGEL, Philosophie der Kunst oder 
Ästhetik (Mitschrift von Kehler 1826), cit., p. 235. 
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absolute freedom of spirit which is utterly consoled in advance in 
every human undertaking, to this world of private serenity», Hegel 
says, «that Aristophanes conducts us»48. 
Indeed: Aristophanes’ Clouds exhibits the three characteristics 
of comedy emphasized above. Its main protagonist, Strepsiades, is 
not motivated by substantial concerns such as family, state, or re-
ligion. His concern is himself – more particularly, his desire to learn 
from Socrates how to talk his way out of debt. His scheme is ridic-
ulous and, on some level, he knows it – a fact made obvious by his 
lascivious digressions, punning asides, and other disruptions of 
Socrates’ (likewise ridiculous) lesson plans. His chosen means of 
attaining his ends are equally self-negating: despite his obvious in-
tellectual limitations, he enrolls as a student in Socrates’ Thinkery49. 
When these limitations predictably defeat him, he enrolls his son, 
who, learning from Socrates that the gods do not exist, promptly 
abandons his filial duties to Strepsiades, beating and insulting him 
until Strepsiades flees his own house. The play ends with Strepsia-
des cheerfully revenging himself by setting fire to Socrates’ Think-
ery, negating his own attempted negation of the substantial order, 
reconciling himself again to the old order.  
It is this negated negation, to repeat, that confirms 
Aristophanes’ creations as ‘genuine art’. Like other art forms, He-
gel says that comedy too must use  
 
its presentation to bring the absolutely rational into appearance, 
not at all as what is broken up and perverted in itself but on the 
contrary as what assigns neither the victory nor, in the last resort, 
permanence in the real world to folly and unreason, to false op-
positions and contradictions50.  
 
I take this to mean that Aristophanes’ comedies, for all their 
raucousness, sensuously embody the Idea by portraying a unity that 
goes out of itself into division then returns to itself in reunification. 
Because Strepsiades’ aims were contradictory, they destroyed 
 
48 Ä, III, p. 553; p. 1221. 
49 Compare G.W.F. HEGEL, Philosophie der Kunst oder Ästhetik (Mitschrift von Kehler 
1826), cit., p. 235. 
50 Ä, III, p. 530; p. 1202. 
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themselves, negating sophistry’s attempted negation of ethical life. 
What is left after this negation is, then, substance: in the case of 
Clouds, the laws of Athens, safe again (however briefly) from Soc-
rates’ corrosive critique. But – again like the reconciliation at the 
end of tragedy – the substance that survives now includes division 
and reflection and so is a unification of unity and division rather 
than an undifferentiated unity. As opposite as they are in every 
other way, ancient tragedy and Old Comedy yield similar results: 
subjectivity asserts itself in action; its aims are destroyed; it reunites 
with the whole from which it emerged, transforming that whole in 
the process.  
Clouds also helps us isolate other characteristics of Old Com-
edy that differentiate it from its modern successors. First: even in 
all its subjective glory, Old Comedy was still oriented around the 
substantial. «[T]he old Greek comedy keeps precisely within this 
objective and substantive sphere», Hegel writes51; «at least in the 
old comedy, it is also the general public interests that are empha-
sized»52. Behind their scatological lewdness, Aristophanes’ charac-
ters almost despite themselves address major concerns about po-
litical representation, civic responsibility, war, and the role of art in 
the preservation of the state. In the case of Clouds, Strepsiades’ an-
tics in particular raise concerns about political authority in the face 
of challenges from both the sophists and Socrates. To repeat: in 
his lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel makes clear that 
Aristophanes and the Athenian court were «perfectly right» to con-
sider Socrates a threat to Greek ethical life. However much Socra-
tes’ insistence that the norms of Athens subject themselves to ra-
tional scrutiny might be justified in the long term, there was as yet 
no way to integrate this insight into Athenian institutions. Socrates 
and Athens were thus necessarily (Hegel even says tragically) op-
posed. Aristophanes, perhaps out of concern for Athens’ security, 
exposed the destructive side of Socrates’ dialectic: its potential to 
be misused in the service of unscrupulous, self-interested goals in-
stead of in pursuit of a truth that transcends tradition. Despite the 
 
51 Ivi, p. 553; p. 1221. 
52 Ivi, p. 536; p. 1206. Compare G.W.F. HEGEL, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie 
der Kunst (Mitschrift Hotho 1823), cit., pp. 310-311. 
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fact that his pillorying of Socrates may well have contributed to the 
latter’s execution, Aristophanes consequently earns Hegel’s em-
phatic respect53. Aristophanes «did not make fun of what was truly 
moral in the life of the Athenians, or of their genuine philosophy, 
true religious faith, and serious art» but rather of what threatened 
to undo them. Aristophanes was «not a cold or malignant scoffer», 
Hegel concludes: «from all his works it appears what a noble, ex-
cellent, true Athenian citizen he was»54.  
But there is yet another layer to comedy – or at least to Hegel’s 
admittedly over-determined analysis of Clouds – that I think ex-
plains its elevated position in Hegel’s system. In more ways than 
one, comedy shows humans to be self-determining and free, not 
subject to divine or social law. Clouds credits Socrates with teaching 
that there are no gods: humans instead are the source of their own 
laws. The ‘credit’ here is complicated: although Socrates is mocked 
throughout Clouds, Hegel seems to think that the positive side of 
his message nevertheless comes through, perhaps despite 
Aristophanes’ intent. So Hegel praises Aristophanes both for ex-
plicitly recognizing the danger of Socrates’ teaching and for – per-
haps unintentionally – crystallizing its truth. The message of Clouds, 
in H.S. Harris’ words, is that humans should «recognize themselves 
as world-creators, and as the creators of the Gods». If this is true, 
Harris continues,  
 
 
53 See also Hegel’s discussion of Socrates and Aristophanes at Ä, II, p. 120; 
p. 511. Hegel also praises Aristophanes for correctly isolating the comic tension 
in Socrates’ philosophy itself: «It is, generally speaking, not possible to joke in 
an external way about what does not contain matters for joking or irony in itself. 
For what really is comical is to show a man or a thing as they disclose themselves 
in their extent; and if the thing is not itself a contradiction, the comic element is 
superficial and groundless» (VGP, I, pp. 482-483; pp. 427-428). If Socrates’ 
teaching had been unambiguous or in complete accordance with the times, at-
tempts to laugh about it would be «external» and ineffective. But through the 
image of Socrates, «Aristophanes presents to us the absolute contradiction be-
tween (a) the true essence of religion and political and ethical life, and (b) the 
subjective attitude of citizens and individuals who should give actuality to that 
essence» (Ä, II, p. 555; p. 1222). 
54 Ä, III, p. 554; p. 1222. Compare G.W.F. HEGEL, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie 
der Kunst (Mitschrift Hotho 1823), cit., p. 311. 
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[c]omedy is the moment of perfect self-consciousness of what 
Art is. We have left the realm of the immediately natural self and 
entered that of rational self-certainty. Thinking is now recognized 
as “absolute might”; God does not need to be embodied in a 
statue, in an athlete, or in a tragic hero presented to us in an imi-
tative mode, as a model for our imitation55. 
 
In brief, comedy suggests that we no longer need representa-
tions of the divine: we are the divine. Art was, we remember, meant 
to express the Idea and so help humans overcome the provisional 
opposition between divine and human. Insofar as humans now see 
themselves as divine, this goal too has been achieved.  
This self-determination can be seen, too, in the fact that 
comic characters do not one-sidedly identify with roles as do 
tragic characters. Comedy in fact explicitly shows its characters 
to be aware of their power over their roles, able as Allen Speight 
puts it to «come out from behind a mask and, with a wink at the 
audience, play ironically with the dramatic illusion» both are en-
gaged in56. Comic characters in a sense play with the concept of 
drama itself, removing the traditional mask to allow subjectivity 
to emerge. In the case of Clouds, Aristophanes famously uses the 
chorus to cajole the audience into casting their votes in the play’s 
favor, thus eliminating the fictional distance between actors and 
spectators otherwise typical of drama. This more open relation-
ship in turn means that «[t]he ‘artist’ in comedy is free to play with 
 
55 H.S. HARRIS, Hegel’s Ladder II: The Odyssey of Spirit, cit., p. 638. Harris’ account 
is based on the Phenomenology of Spirit, but much of his analysis is relevant for 
determining comedy’s role in the lectures on aesthetics as well. As Paolucci 
points out, Hegel discusses comedy in several unexpected places, including the 
Natural Law essay, where he considers world history in the light of tragedy and 
comedy and discusses the sense in which Dante’s Divine Comedy is indeed a com-
edy (A. PAOLUCCI, Hegel’s Theory of Comedy, cit., p. 91). 
56 A. SPEIGHT, Hegel, Literature, and the Problem of Agency, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2001, p. 73. Speight uses this characteristic of comedy to de-
velop a theory of its «theatricality» as opposed to tragedy’s «retrospectivity» in a 
greater theory of art’s role in Hegel’s theory of agency: see especially the sections 
on comedy at pp. 69-74. It seems, incidentally, that Hegel was wrong in thinking 
that ancient comic actors did not wear masks (ivi, p. 74). 
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the strictures of drama that the tragic character could only ‘rec-
ognize’ but could not give up»57.  
Ancient drama in any form cannot match the peaceful inter-
penetration of human and divine perfectly achieved in sculpture. 
Yet in another sense it transcends sculpture by incorporating 
back into a unity what sculpture cannot depict, namely the interi-
ority that converts happenings into actions. Ancient tragedy and 
comedy retain their status as art by depicting the reunification 
that follows after action disrupts divine unity: in tragedy through 
the characters’ destruction; in comedy, through the characters’ 
self-destructive aims. But comedy, it seems to me, indeed sur-
passes tragedy’s ability to convey the Idea in sensuous form. Ar-
istophanes, in Hegel’s philosophical analysis, shows humans to 
be masters of their world instead of tragically succumbing to a 
necessity they recognize but not as their own. Unlike Antigone, 
in other words, Aristophanes’ characters do not defer to immu-
table divine laws. They instead understand themselves as the cre-
ators of the gods and so as free. Old Comedy then comes closer 
to conveying Hegel’s ultimate philosophical conviction: that hu-
mans are the part of the whole that recognizes and articulates its 
contribution to the whole’s dynamic unity58.  
As much as Hegel celebrates the free exuberance of 
Aristophanes’ comedies, he is clear-eyed about what they meant 
for Greek life. «But in this very triumph of the subjective attitude, 
whatever its insight», he says, «there is implicit one of the greatest 
symptoms of Greek corruption»59. Indeed, Aristophanes’ other 
 
57 Ivi, p. 73. Shapiro makes a similar claim: «Art realizes its aim when one who 
plays or puts on this show is no longer clearly distinct from the one who watches 
the show»; «in fact [Hegel] has attempted to show that tragedy is an incoherent 
effort to establish a totality of artistic meaning. If the preceding analysis is cor-
rect, Hegel has given what amounts to a transcendental deduction of comedy as 
the only possible way of overcoming the dichotomies posed by our experience 
of artistic intentions and interpretations» (G. SHAPIRO, Hegel’s Dialectic of Artistic 
Meaning, cit., p. 32). 
58 See also H. SCHNEIDER, Hegels Theorie der Komik und die Auflösung der schönen 
Kunst, cit., p. 86. 
59 Ä, III, p. 555; p. 1222. 
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plays detail the «flighty gossip, litigiousness, etc., and the aberra-
tions of the democracy out of which the old faith and morals had 
vanished». These vices, combined with the dissolution of the gods, 
signal the end of Greek Sittlichkeit60. Hegel suggests that the Athe-
nians, however dimly, recognized this. Old Comedy ends, then, 
with Athens laughing at its own self-negation: at having produced, 
through subjectivity and its effects, the means of its own destruc-
tion. Harris calls this the «existential truth of Hegel’s claims about 
the significance of the Old Comedy»: although Aristophanes was 
depicting the erosion of their way of life, «the audience went to the 
theater to enjoy themselves. They knew what they were watching, 
but they laughed»61.  
With the end of Athenian civilization came also the end of 
art’s explicit efforts to depict the interpenetration of the divine and 
the human. Once the gods are revealed to be human creations, ta-
les of their exploits are no longer compelling. Humans’ attention 
turns from the divine to themselves62. The development of so-
called New Comedy – the dramas of the Greek poet Menander and 
his Roman successors Plautus and Terence – is evidence of this 
shift63. New Comedy seldom depicts gods or even substantial mat-
 
60 Ivi, p. 530; p. 1202. 
61 H.S. HARRIS, Hegel’s Ladder II: The Odyssey of Spirit, cit., p. 638. See also K. DE 
BOER, The Eternal Irony of the Community: Aristophanian Echoes in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit, «Inquiry», LII (4), 2009, p. 318. In his 1823 lectures, 
Hegel puts it this way: «Dies ist der letzte Punkt der Ausdehnung der 
Versöhnung, die die Subjektivität sich erringt. Im Komischen hat die Kunst ihr 
Ende» (G.W.F. HEGEL, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst (Mitschrift Hotho 
1823), cit., p. 311). Compare Hegel’s comments in G.W.F. HEGEL, Philosophie der 
Kunst oder Ästhetik (Mitschrift von Kehler 1826), cit., p. 235. 
62 This shift to the human had already begun in tragedy: the older tragedies of 
Aeschylus had been heavily symbolic, using poetic language to narrate the activ-
ities of the gods. Euripides’ later tragedies instead took up human concerns in 
language much closer to spoken Greek. Aristophanes had lampooned this evi-
dence of increasing subjectivity as well: in the Frogs, he depicts Dionysus, des-
perate after Euripides’ death to retrieve him from the underworld, instead 
choosing Aeschylus for the sake of the city.  
63 M.S. Silk concludes that Aristophanes’ plays Cocalus, Ecclesiazusae, and Plutus 
all tend in this direction already, making Aristophanes a key in the transition 
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ters such as family, religion, or politics. Instead it showcases intri-
cate plots of domestic intrigue: slaves trick masters, children de-
ceive fathers, lovers are thwarted then reunited through circum-
stances ever more ridiculously coincidental. As a result, 
protagonists’ ends are no longer self-negating in the technical sense 
that they result in nothing and so evaporate, reestablishing a har-
mony with the divine. Since New Comedy does not even aspire to 
depict humans reuniting with the divine, it cannot fully satisfy art’s 
mandate.  
Given that art has abandoned its defining goal, its develop-
ment after Old Comedy’s dissipation goes in sometimes con-
trasting directions. The first is an additional genre of dramatic po-
etry (which Hegel confusingly calls «drama, i.e. a play in the 
narrower sense of the word»64) that provides an easier but more 
facile reconciliation than Old Comedy. Falling into this category 
are tragicomedies that simply mix serious action with comic char-
acters, and plays such as Eumenides and Philoctetes, whose resolutions 
are artificially accomplished by divine commands65. The poet in 
such works is tempted to «devote the whole force of his produc-
tion to the inner life of the dramatis personae» or to depicting «situa-
tions and customs of the period»66. No tension between subject 
and substance is evoked, making reconciliation superfluous. The 
poetic, Hegel stipulated, signified art’s attempts to embody the re-
unification of human and divine, subject and substance. Lacking 
even an aspiration to evoke this truth, drama begins to «laps[e] into 
prose»67. 
 
to New Comedy rather than its opponent. Silk concludes: «The narrowing of 
horizons to a world of social behavior and domestic relationships between 
more or less ordinary people – the elimination, in effect, of some of the most 
distinctive characteristics of Old Comedy as a genre – is partly the work of 
Old Comedy’s most renowned exponent» (M.S. SILK, Aristophanes and the Def-
inition of Comedy, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000, p. 52). See also ivi, p. 
231.  
64 Ä, III, p. 521; p. 1194. 
65 Ivi, p. 532; p. 1204. 
66 Ivi, p. 533; p. 1204. 
67 Ibidem. 
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Art’s second direction in the wake of New Comedy is satire. 
Satire’s primary purpose is to expose the gap between the divine 
and the human, or between ideals of virtue and corrupt reality. Be-
cause it dwells in this disharmony, Hegel says that satire is also 
more prosaic than poetic: in satire, «poetic reconciliation» vanishes; 
instead, «the unresolved nature of this opposition in which inner 
and outer remain in fixed disharmony constitutes the prosaic charac-
ter of the relation between the two sides»68. The distance between 
human and divine is all the more painful in satire since it succeeds 
the beautiful unity of ancient Greece. Classical art’s «peaceful rec-
onciliation» has been deserted; reality appears «godless and cor-
rupt»69. Unlike Aristophanes’ patriotic attempts to expose the self-
negating nature of forces threatening his society, the satirist «clings 
discontentedly to the disharmony between its own subjectivity […] 
and to this extent produces neither true poetry nor true works of 
art»70. As a result, «the classical art-form appears as superseded», 
leading to the «downfall of the plastic gods and the beautiful world 
of men»71. 
 
 
3. Subjectivity and Art’s Dissolution 
 
A. Modern Tragedy 
  
Despite the appearance of these weakened dramatic genres, 
however, tragedy and comedy survive and evolve, in less perfect 
form, in the post-classical world. In both cases, diagnosing their 
diminished status requires tracing the increasing prominence of 
subjectivity and its effects on art. 
Modern tragedy is characterized by the intensification of sub-
jectivity in a genre whose essence is the substantial: «even in mod-
ern tragedy», Hegel says, «the principle of subjectivity, free on its 
 
68 Ä, II, p. 123; p. 513 (emphasis mine). 
69 Ibidem. 
70 Ivi, p. 125; p. 514. 
71 Ivi, p. 121; p. 512. 
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own account in comedy, becomes dominant»72. Tragedy’s principal 
topic is consequently «provided by an individual’s passion, which 
is satisfied in the pursuit of a purely subjective end and, in general, 
by the fate of a single individual and his character»73. Substantial 
concerns may still play a role, but only as the plot’s background, 
not as the «ultimate object of [the character’s] willing and acting»74.  
Subjectivity’s incursion into tragedy explains several changes 
in the genre. First: the subject matter of ancient tragedies was lim-
ited to issues of substance such as the family, religion, and state. 
Since by contrast an individual’s particular aims can be the subject 
of modern tragedy, the whole spectrum of human activity is fair 
game. Modern dramatists consequently produce tragedies featur-
ing political ambition, romantic love, sibling rivalry, and any num-
ber of other variations. The shift towards subjectivity also explains 
the chronic indecision typical of protagonists such as Hamlet or 
Wallenstein. While Antigone and Creon knew immediately what 
their roles required of them, modern protagonists’ ends have no 
divine justification. Instead of acting with conviction, they indulge 
in agonized «swithering»75. Worse: when these characters act and 
bring about their own destruction, the lack of divine justification 
means that their deaths resemble cold, criminal justice rather than 
the execution of divine law76. 
These consequences of increased subjectivity in modern trag-
edy in turn impact Hegel’s evaluation of whether tragedy achieves 
the unity and necessity characteristic of art. As to unity: since the 
situations underlying modern tragedies are based in the subjective 
and not in the substantial, their denouements do not depict the 
Idea in the sense of the unity of the human and the divine. Since 
neither Wallenstein’s nor Hamlet’s aims, for example, are corre-
lated with divine law to begin with, their deaths at the tragedy’s end 
 
72 Ä, III, p. 532; p. 1203. 
73 Ivi, p. 536; p. 1206. 
74 Ivi, p. 537; p. 1207. 
75 Ivi, p. 546; p. 1214. 
76 Ivi, p. 565; p. 1230. I discuss these characteristics of modern tragedy in more 
detail in L. MOLAND, An Unrelieved Heart: Hegel, Tragedy, and Schiller’s Wallenstein, 
«New German Critique», XXXVIII (2 113), 2011, pp. 1-23, pp. 12-16. 
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cannot restore a disrupted divine unity. Art was also meant to re-
affirm our unity with the ethical order and give us a sense of re-
stored unity with the divine. Modern tragedies no longer do this.  
As regards necessity: the development of subjectivity weakens 
the necessity characteristic of tragedy in particular and of art in 
general. Because modern tragedy depicts not the inevitable clash 
of fated powers but that of contingent human projects, modern 
tragedy does not share ancient tragedy’s inevitability. Unlike Antig-
one and Creon, Hamlet and Wallenstein could have chosen differ-
ently and presumably avoided their fates. Modern protagonists’ 
lack of divine justification is again relevant here. While Antigone 
and Creon could cite eternal law as their justification, Hamlet and 
Wallenstein have no justification beyond their own conviction. 
Their fates are the result of a «purely horrible, external necessity»77: 
necessity not generated by divine law but by the contingent situa-
tions humans actions create.  
As a result of tragedy’s weakened unity and necessity, modern 
audiences can no longer leave the theater with cheerful hearts. We 
are denied the relief provided by the restoration of the ethical order 
and the sense that the characters’ suffering was necessary. Modern 
audiences might take some consolation, Hegel admits, in the fact 
that Hamlet appeared doomed by his own «inner disgust» for life 
and that Romeo and Juliet’s love seemed too beautiful for the 
world. Nevertheless, any such comfort will be only «a grievous rec-
onciliation, an unhappy bliss in misfortune»78. It will not alleviate 
what Hegel calls modern tragedy’s dreadful, horrible effects79. Sub-
jectivity’s cumulative effect on tragedy as a genre, in short, is to 
weaken it, and its weakness makes its culminating suffering unnec-
essary.  
And here Hegel’s seemingly cavalier «And why not?» reveals 
its systematic significance. If, as Hegel claims, «there is no […] in-
evitability [in modern tragedy], mere suffering and misfortune are 
not justified by anything», and dramatists may as well deliver «a 
 
77 Ä, III, p. 566; p. 1231. 
78 Ivi, pp. 566-567; p. 1232. 
79 Ivi, p. 567; p. 1231. 
 Lydia Moland Articles 
 
98 
happy outcome». He continues: «To prefer misfortune, just be-
cause it is misfortune, instead of a happy resolution, has no other 
basis but a certain superior sentimentality»80. Faced with art’s weak-
ened unity and fading necessity, modern spectators’ best course of 
action, it seems, is to laugh. 
 
B. Modern Comedy 
 
But since modern comedies also do not escape subjectivity’s 
development unscathed, matters are not so easy. If the effect of 
modern subjectivity’s intrusion into tragedy was to weaken its es-
sential tie to substance, its effect on comedy’s core, which is already 
subjectivity, is to dissociate comedy from substance altogether. 
The effect, ultimately, will be the same: modern subjectivity loos-
ens comedy’s necessity and prevents it from depicting the reunifi-
cation that sensuously embodies the Idea.  
Hegel enumerates several of subjectivity’s effects on comedy. 
The most obvious is that modern comedy follows New Comedy 
in depicting personal affairs and domestic intrigue. Whereas Strep-
siades’ self-negating aims served to expose sophistry’s corrosive ef-
fect on public life, modern comedies limit themselves to the trivi-
alities of the domestic sphere. Like New Comedy and modern 
tragedies, then, they do not attempt to depict humans’ reunifica-
tion with the divine and so are already a weakened form of art. No 
interpenetration of divine and human, subject and substance is to 
be found here, and Hegel phrases his lament specifically in terms 
of this lost unity: «a frank joviality as pervades the comedies of 
Aristophanes as a constant reconciliation does not animate this kind of 
modern comedy at all»81.  
Also like modern tragedies, modern comedies lack necessity. 
As examples, Hegel references tragicomedies of his time in which 
 
80 Ibidem. 
81 Ivi, p. 571; p. 1235, emphasis mine. In addition to his discussion of modern 
comedy, Hegel gives an analysis of humor in the final sections of the second 
part of his lectures. As I argue in forthcoming work, humor should not be 
equated with comedy. Although there are similarities, humor was a particularly 
modern phenomenon with its own aesthetic history.  
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«some blackguard or rascal» follows his own moral compass, un-
tethered to any objective moral criteria. Given the arbitrary nature 
of the protagonist’s convictions, such comedies easily end with the 
character’s conversion to the good. But since this change tracks no 
necessary development in his character, the transformation seems 
superficial and implausible82. As another substitute for real neces-
sity, some modern plays further develop New Comedy’s propen-
sity for ingenious plotlines driven by cunning deception and far-
fetched coincidence. The Spanish are especially good at producing 
such plays, Hegel says: but even their tightly woven plots have their 
source in the subject, not in substance, and so exhibit only external 
necessity83.  
In Old Comedy, characters’ aims were themselves necessarily 
self-negating: laughable to begin with and just as laughably pur-
sued. Modern comedies sometimes also reflect a lack of necessity 
by featuring aims that fail to be self-negating in this sense. As an 
example Hegel cites the eponymous protagonist in Molière’s Tar-
tuffe, a religious hypocrite intent on defrauding his hosts. Tartuffe’s 
aims are not inherently self-negating and neither are his means: he 
is instead a «downright villain» whose aims are «deadly serious» and 
whose means are distressingly plausible84. This lack of necessity in 
turn undermines the cheerfulness that Hegel claimed should char-
acterize comedy. Tartuffe’s mixture of serious aims and spiteful-
ness means we are never laughing with him but only at him. When 
his aims fail, he becomes the «butt of the laughter of others, often 
mixed as it is with malice»85. Many of modern comedy’s stock char-
acters suffer the same fate: «honest masters, fathers, and trustees» 
are put at the «mercy of the projects of other people»86. They can-
not join in the laughter; their hapless good intentions are only 
mocked. There is a difference, Hegel concludes, between comedies 
 
82 Ivi, p. 569; p. 1233. Compare ID., Philosophie der Kunst oder Ästhetik (Mitschrift 
von Kehler 1826), cit., p. 234. 
83 Ä, III, p. 571; p. 1235. 
84 Ivi, p. 570; p. 1234. Compare ID., Philosophie der Kunst oder Ästhetik (Mitschrift 
von Kehler 1826), cit., p. 234. 
85 Ä, III, p. 569; p. 1234. 
86 Ivi, p. 571; p. 1235. 
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in which «the dramatis personae are comical themselves or only in 
the eyes of the audience»; «the former case alone», he concludes, 
«can be counted as really comical»87. It is not clear, then, that plays 
such as Tartuffe are even comedies in this technical sense. In any 
event, what passes for modern comedy, Hegel complains, is often 
moralizing, superficial, and cruel.  
Yet another consequence of these characters’ deadly serious-
ness is that modern playwrights, including Molière, sometimes 
abandon poetry for prose88. The language in such cases mirrors the 
content: Molière’s social satires expose the opposition of virtue and 
reality, the very kind of unresolved tension that led Hegel to pro-
claim that satire is not poetic but prosaic. This lack of unity finds 
expression in language which itself makes no pretense to the play-
ful creativity that characterizes poetry.  
Hegel sees these subjective trends worsening, lamenting that 
the «subjective sense of something corresponding with me or not» 
has «recently been proposed as the principle of dramatic success 
or failure»89. Modern dramas in other words often make no attempt 
to portray sensuously the unity of the human and the divine: what 
they produce «is not a genuinely poetic emotion but only one that 
people ordinarily feel». When modern playwrights are not up to the 
task of evoking a higher sense of our unity with the world, they 
instead «seek to reform the public or merely to entertain it» with 
complicated plots or thrilling effects90. In none of these cases is 
 
87 Ivi, p. 552; p. 1220. Compare Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst (Mitschrift 
Hotho 1823), p. 310. Here Hegel suggests that in some comedies, servants be-
come the characters who replicate Strepsiades’ cheerful self-mockery. He also 
discusses both Ariosto and Cervantes as successful examples of modern comic 
sensibility: since neither are dramas and so are not comedies in Hegel’s more 
technical sense, I leave them aside. See Ä, II, pp. 217-218; pp. 591-592. See also 
K. VIEWEG, Heiterer Leichtsinn und fröhlicher Scharfsinn: Zu Hegels Verständnis von 
Komik und Humor als Formen ästhetisch-poetischer Skepsis, in Die geschichtliche Bedeutung 
der Kunst und die Bestimmung der Künste, ed. by B. Collenberg-Plotnikov, A. Geth-
mann-Siefert, and L. de Vos, Fink, Munich 2005, pp. 297-310, p. 304. 
88 Ä, III, p. 569; p. 1234. Tartuffe itself is written in Alexandrine verse. 
89 Ivi, pp. 524-525; p. 1197. 
90 Ivi, p. 533; pp. 1204-1205. 
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comedy depicting the Idea in sensuous form; in most of them, 
then, it simply ceases to be art91.  
 
 
4. The Future of Art’s End 
 
Despite its deleterious effects on art, subjectivity continues to 
develop towards its more positive conclusion by other means, 
namely religion and philosophy. This, then, is another way art ends: 
by becoming prosaic and lapsing into other forms of Absolute 
Spirit. Through religion and philosophy, humans continue to ex-
plore how subjectivity can be integrated into ethical life. Christian-
ity for instance began to assert the existence of the divine in every 
human and so claims the reunification of subjectivity and sub-
stance92. As of very recently, Hegel thought, philosophy had suc-
ceeded in asserting that all humans are free, and that our self-de-
termining status means we must take responsibility for our role in 
the formation of the world around us. But this assertion can only 
be articulated in prose, specifically the prose of philosophy. In-
deed, a philosophical explication of our unity with the divine is what 
Hegel takes himself to be striving for in his own work93. Hegel’s 
system aims to make clear to thought through thought that humans are 
our own sources of authority, existing in a mutually formative re-
 
91 Perhaps this proliferation of comedies that are not actually art explains why 
Hegel’s discussion of comedy is so perfunctory: the range of what can count as 
modern comedy is vast, but so little of it is actually art that there very little, sys-
tematically speaking, to say about it. I am grateful to Martin Donougho for this 
suggestion. 
92 Schneider points out that in the 1821 lectures, Hegel explicitly emphasizes the 
transition from the comedies of Aristophanes to religion: see H. SCHNEIDER, 
Hegels Theorie der Komik und die Auflösung der schönen Kunst, cit., p. 108. See also 
Paolucci: subjective personality «raises poetry to a peak of subjective self-confi-
dence without objective support. It is art’s last bloom. It smiles a self-assured 
smile, and then there is the fall into prose» (A. PAOLUCCI, Hegel’s Theory of Comedy, 
cit., p. 107). 
93 The question of whether Hegel’s own philosophy is also poetic is considered 
for instance by G. SHAPIRO, Hegel on the Meanings of Poetry, «Philosophy and Rhet-
oric», VIII (2), 1975, pp. 88-107, pp. 100-106. 
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lationship with others and our surroundings. Hegel’s political phi-
losophy, for instance, details the minutiae of political, economic, 
and family life, showing how everything from marriage to legisla-
tive bodies can confirm the unity and necessity implied by his ide-
alism. And while philosophy’s articulation of universal freedom 
was yet to be fully embedded in these institutions, the modern 
world was no longer hostile to the self-determination and justifica-
tion that subjectivity requires. 
But none of this progress, in Hegel’s view, is good news for 
art. Modern humans are prosaic creatures, concerned with eco-
nomics and politics and preoccupied by the domestic disputes and 
social intrigue that characterized New Comedy. We cannot return 
to the sweeping conflict of Aeschylus or Aristophanes since, just 
as the Socrates of the Clouds claimed, there are no gods to turn to, 
only ourselves. Our creative god-like powers themselves are, by 
virtue of being so prosaic, extremely difficult to translate into art. 
Our keen sense of our interiority makes it difficult to portray our 
essence in art which, by virtue of being sensuous, can only imper-
fectly depict the internal. We are also primarily rational, prone to 
looking for truth in argumentative justification rather than artistic 
representation. These rational endeavors are next to impossible to 
embody in music, painting, or poetry94.  
Despite these obstacles, humans will and should continue to 
make art. When that art is successful, it will be because it evokes, 
however imperfectly, the unity and necessity of the Idea. Masters of 
Dutch genre painting such as Vermeer and Rembrandt, to take a few 
of Hegel’s favorite examples, use their talent for color and compo-
sition to create paintings in which each part seems necessary and the 
whole is unified95. A drama can have a particularly well-integrated 
cast of characters or an especially tight plot in which no action, no 
dialogue, seems out of place. Hegel mentions Goethe’s Iphigenia as a 
«real poetic masterpiece» that manages to combine a serious topic 
with a happy, or at least reconciled, ending96. The reconciliation here 
is brought about by humans, not gods, a fact that highlights human 
 
94 Ä, I, p. 253; pp. 193-194. 
95 Ä, II, pp. 225 ff; pp. 597 ff. 
96 Ä, III, p. 533; p. 1204. 
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agency and makes the play an example of a successful modern art-
work. Hegel’s editor Hotho offers us the tantalizing possibility that 
Hegel thought Shakespeare had achieved «a type of comedy which 
is truly comical and truly poetic» and so had succeeded in rivaling 
Aristophanes’ accomplishments97. 
Just as the sculpture of ancient Greece embodied the norma-
tive worldview of Athenian citizens, art that reflects to us our own 
worldview will continue to be meaningful. Humanus, Hegel ironi-
cally reports, is art’s new holy of holies; given our new-found un-
derstanding of ourselves as divine, we can continue to produce 
meaningful art by coming to see the divine in our mundane con-
cerns98. Dutch genre painting, Hegel suggests, embodies the insight 
that human concerns are divine concerns by evoking the signifi-
cance of domestic table settings, a woman’s secretive smile, the ca-
maraderie of a group of watchmen. Poetry that reveals hidden 
meaning and resonance in language can perform a similar function, 
as modern examples such as Goethe’s West-östlicher Divan show. In 
general, art that can express «imperishable humanity in its many-sided 
significance and endless all-round development» will continue to have 
meaning for us99. It will allow us to recognize, admittedly in a limited 
way, our co-authorship of the world and so to experience the Idea 
sensuously embodied in the Ideal.  
*** 
So what can this analysis tell us about the end of art and com-
edy’s place in that end? 
First, Kaminsky is certainly not correct to see in all comedy only 
a frivolous distraction. Hegel took Aristophanes extremely seriously, 
seeing in his comedies a reckoning with the dangers of a subjectivity 
as yet unincorporated into ethical life. But if Shapiro is right that 
comedy is the culmination of art, it is a sorrowful, perhaps even 
tragic, culmination. Ancient comedy, specifically Old Comedy, does 
indeed express humans’ unity with the divine in sensuous form, and 
 
97 Ivi, p. 571; p. 1235. Unfortunately, there is no evidence in the existing lecture 
notes that Hegel made this claim about Shakespeare. 
98 Ä, II, p. 237; p. 607. 
99 Ivi, p. 239; p. 608. 
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it aspires to do this more completely than sculpture can by giving us 
access to characters’ deliberations and intentions, however ignoble, 
and so depicting action. In the most sensuous way possible, comedy 
embodies humans’ acknowledgement that they are the creators of 
their own gods and so, in Hegel’s dialectical sense, unified with them. 
It shows humans as lighthearted and cheerful in this realization even 
as it becomes clear that it has come, as it were, too soon to be sus-
tained without dissolving the ethical life that produced it. In their 
lighthearted self-knowledge, characters in Old Comedy exhibit their 
understanding that their fate is self-caused, not the product of an in-
explicable divine force. For these reasons, Old Comedy is, as Harris 
puts it, art’s philosophical culmination. But as a philosophical culmina-
tion, it is no longer art’s culmination but rather the beginning of its 
protracted end100. 
It is part of art’s dialectic that comedy, in gesturing at a higher 
truth than art can encompass, signals its decline. But even if art is 
no longer able to articulate the more developed inclusion of sub-
jectivity that the modern world requires, it will remain one of the 
ways we grapple with our place in the world’s structure. Given that 
the requirements for unity and necessity have loosened, the range 
of ways art can do this has broadened significantly. Indeed, Hegel 
presciently imagines a world in which art has neither prescribed 
form nor necessary content: a world in which anything, essentially, 
can be art. If this is the case, Hegel’s question remains: why not 
prefer dramas with happy endings? To art’s modern lack of neces-
sity, an arbitrary preference is perhaps the only systematically con-
sistent response. 
 
100 See H.S. HARRIS, Hegel’s Ladder II: The Odyssey of Spirit, cit., p. 647. Paolucci 
similarly argues that romantic art is the «most profound (though possibly not 
the most aesthetically perfect) expression of art» because it is «on the verge, and 
even beyond the verge, of transcending itself as art» (A. PAOLUCCI, Hegel’s Theory 
of Comedy, cit., p. 105). On art’s end being an extended process, see Schneider, 
H. SCHNEIDER, Hegels Theorie der Komik und die Auflösung der schönen Kunst, cit., pp. 
103-104. 
  
